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We present a two-party protocol for quantum gambling, a new task closely related to coin tossing.
The protocol allows two remote parties to play a gambling game, such that in a certain limit it
becomes a fair game. No unconditionally secure classical method is known to accomplish this task.
Quantum cryptography is a field which combines quan-
tum theory with information theory. The goal of this field
is to use the laws of physics to provide secure informa-
tion exchange, in contrast to classical methods based on
(unproven) complexity assumptions. In particular, quan-
tum key distribution protocols [1] became especially im-
portant due to technological advances which allow their
implementation in the laboratory. However, the last im-
portant theoretical result in the field was of a negative
character: Mayers [2] and Lo and Chau [3] showed that
quantum bit commitment is not secure. Their work also
raised serious doubts on the possibility of obtaining any
secure two-party protocol, such as oblivious transfer and
coin tossing [4]. In this Letter we present a secure two-
party quantum cryptographic task – quantum gambling,
which has no classical counterpart.
Coin tossing is defined as a method of generating a ran-
dom bit over a communication channel between two dis-
tant parties. The parties, traditionally named Alice and
Bob, do not trust each other, or a third party. They cre-
ate the random bit by exchanging quantum and classical
information. At the end of the protocol the generated bit
is known to both of them. If a party cheats, i.e. changes
the occurrence probability of an outcome, the other party
should be able to detect the cheating. We would consider
a coin tossing protocol to be secure if it defines a param-
eter such that when it goes to infinity the probability to
detect any finite change of probabilities goes to 1. Using
a secure protocol the parties can make certain decisions
depending on the value of the random bit, without being
afraid that the opponent may have some advantage. For
instance, Alice and Bob can play a game in which Alice
wins if the outcome is ‘0’ and Bob wins if it is ‘1’. Note
that if bit commitment were secure, it could be used to
implement coin tossing trivially: Alice commits a bit a
to Bob; Bob tells Alice the value of a bit b; the random
bit is the parity bit of a and b.
It is not known today if a secure quantum coin tossing
protocol can be found [5]. It is only known that ideal coin
tossing, i.e. in which no party can change the expected
distribution of the outcomes, is impossible [6]. Based on
our efforts in this direction, we are skeptical about the
possibility to have secure (non-ideal) coin tossing. Never-
theless, we were able to construct a protocol which gives
a solution to a closely related task. “Quantum gambling”
is very close to playing in a casino located in a remote
site, such as gambling over the Internet. As in a real
casino, for instance when playing Roulette, the player’s
possible choices give him some probability to win twice
the amount of his bet, or a smaller probability to win
a bigger sum. However, in our protocol the player has
only a partial control over these choices. In spite of its
limitations our protocol provides a quantum solution to
a useful task, which cannot be performed securely today
in the classical framework. Assuming ideal apparata and
communication channels, the protocol is unconditionally
secure, depending solely on the laws of physics.
Let us start by defining exactly the gambling task con-
sidered here. The casino (Alice) and the player (Bob) are
physically separated, communicating via quantum and
classical channels. The bet of Bob in a single game is
taken for simplicity to be 1 coin. At the end of a game
the player wins 1 or R coins, or loses 1 coin (his bet),
depending on the result of the game. We have found
a protocol which implement this game while respecting
two requirements: First, the player can ensure that, ir-
respective of what the casino does, his expected gain is
not less than δ coins, where δ is a negative function of
R which goes to zero when R goes to infinity. The exact
form of δ(R) will be specified below. Second, the casino
can ensure that, irrespective of what the player does, its
expected gain is not less than 0 coins.
In order to define the protocol rigorously, we will first
present the rules of the game, then the strategies of the
players which ensure the outcomes quoted above and fi-
nally we will prove the security of the method.
The Rules of the Game: Alice has two boxes, A
and B, which can store a particle. The quantum states
of the particle in the boxes are denoted by |a〉 and |b〉, re-
spectively. Alice prepares the particle in some state and
sends box B to Bob.
Bob wins in one of the two cases:
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1. If he finds the particle in box B, then Alice pays
him 1 coin (after checking that box A is empty).
2. If he asks Alice to send him box A for verification
and he finds that she initially prepared a state dif-
ferent from
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉+ |b〉), (1)
then Alice pays him R coins.
In any other case Alice wins, and Bob pays her 1 coin.
The players’ strategies which ensure (independently)
an expectation value of Alice’s gain GA ≥ 0 (irrespective
of Bob’s actions) and an expectation value of Bob’s gain
GB ≥ δ (irrespective of Alice’s actions) are as follows:
Alice’s Strategy: Alice prepares the equally dis-
tributed state |ψ0〉 (given in eq.(1)).
Bob’s Strategy: After receiving box B, Bob splits the
particle in two parts; specifically, he performs the follow-
ing unitary operation:
|b〉 →
√
1− η |b〉+√η |b′〉, (2)
where 〈b′|b〉 = 0. The particular splitting parameter η he
uses is η = η˜(R) (to be specified below). After the split-
ting Bob measures the projection operator on the state
|b〉, and then
I. If the measurement yields a positive result, i.e. he
finds the particle, he announces Alice that he won.
II. If the measurement yields a negative result, he asks
Alice for box A and verifies the preparation.
This completes the formal definition of our protocol.
In order to prove the security of the scheme, we will an-
alyze the average gain of each party as a result of her/his
specific strategy. It is straightforward to see that Alice’s
strategy ensures GA ≥ 0. If Alice prepares the state |ψ0〉,
Bob has no meaningful way of increasing his odds beyond
50%: if he decides to open box B he has a probability of
0.5 to win 1 coin and a probability of 0.5 to lose 1 coin.
He cannot cheat by claiming that he found the particle
when he did not, since Alice learns the result by opening
box A. If, instead, he decides to verify the preparation
he will find the expected state, so he will lose 1 coin.
Therefore GB ≤ 0, and since this is a zero-sum game,
Alice’s gain is GA ≥ 0, whatever Bob does.
Now we will prove that Bob, using the splitting param-
eter η = η˜, can ensure GB ≥ δ. The values of η˜ and δ are
determined by the calculation of Bob’s expected gain,
GB. Bob tries to maximize GB under the assumption
that Alice uses the worse strategy for him, namely the
one which minimizes GB for Bob’s particular strategy.
Therefore, we will first minimize the function GB for any
η, and then we will find the maximum of the obtained
function, with that computing δ. We will also compute
the value of η at the peak, η˜, which will be the chosen
splitting parameter of Bob.
Let us first write down the expression for GB. Bob gets
1 coin if he detects the state |b〉; denote the probability
for this event to occur by Pb. He gets R coins if he detects
a different preparation than |ψ0〉 (after failing to find the
state |b〉, an event with a related probability of 1 − Pb);
denote the probability to detect a different preparation
by PD. He loses 1 coin if he does not detect a different
preparation than |ψ0〉 (after failing to find |b〉); the prob-
ability for this event is (1− PD). Thus, the expectation
value of Bob’s gain is
GB = Pb + (1 − Pb) [PDR− (1 − PD)]. (3)
For the calculations of Pb and PD we will consider the
most general state Alice can prepare. In this case the
particle may be located not only in boxes A and B, but
also in other boxes Ci. The states |a〉, |b〉 and |ci〉 are
mutually orthogonal. She can also correlate the particle
to an ancilla |Φ〉, such that the most general preparation
is
|Ψ0〉 = α|a〉|Φa〉+ β|b〉|Φb〉+
∑
i
γi|ci〉|Φci〉, (4)
where |Φa〉, |Φb〉, |Φci〉 are the states of the ancilla and
|α|2 + |β|2 +∑i |γi|2 = 1. After Bob splits |b〉, as de-
scribed by eq.(2), the state changes to
|Ψ1〉 = α|a〉|Φa〉+ β
(√
1− η |b〉+√η |b′〉
)
|Φb〉
+
∑
i
γi|ci〉|Φci〉. (5)
The probability to find the state |b〉 (in step I. of Bob’s
strategy) is
Pb = ||〈b|Ψ1〉||2 = |β|2 (1 − η). (6)
If Bob does not find |b〉, then the state reduces to
|Ψ2〉 = N
(
α|a〉|Φa〉+ β√η |b′〉|Φb〉+
∑
i
γi|ci〉|Φci〉
)
,
(7)
where N is the normalization factor given by N =(
1− (1− η) |β|2)−1/2. On the other hand, if Alice pre-
pares the state |ψ0〉 instead of |Ψ0〉, then at this stage
the particle is in the state
|ψ2〉 =
√
1
1 + η
|a〉+
√
η
1 + η
|b′〉. (8)
Thus, the best verification measurement of Bob is to
make a projection measurement on this state. If the out-
come is negative, Bob knows with certainty that Alice did
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not prepared the state |ψ0〉. The probability of detecting
such a different preparation is given by
PD = 1− ||〈ψ2|Ψ2〉||2
= 1−N 2
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ α√1 + η |Φa〉+ βη√1 + η |Φb〉
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
2
. (9)
Since Alice wants to minimize GB , she tries to min-
imize both Pb and PD. From eq.(9) we see that in or-
der to minimize PD, the states of the ancilla |Φa〉 and
|Φb〉 have to be identical (up to some arbitrary phase),
i.e. |〈Φa|Φb〉| = 1. That is, Alice gets no advantage
using an ancilla, so it can be eliminated. Then, in or-
der to maximize N|α + βη|, Alice should set all γi to
zero, as it is clear from the normalization constraint
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1−∑i |γi|2. This operation has no conflict
with the minimization of Pb, since eq. (6) contains only
|β|. Also, the maximization is possible if the coefficients
α and β, if seen as vectors in the complex space, point
in the same direction. Therefore, Alice gains nothing by
taking α and β to be complex numbers; it is sufficient to
use real positive coefficients. Taking all these consider-
ations into account, the state prepared by Alice can be
simplified to
|ψ′
0
〉 =
√
1
2
+ ǫ |a〉+
√
1
2
− ǫ |b〉. (10)
Now, the state after Bob splits |b〉 reads
|ψ′
1
〉 =
√
1
2
+ ǫ |a〉+
√
1
2
− ǫ
(√
1− η |b〉+√η |b′〉
)
,
(11)
and so the probability to find |b〉 becomes
Pb = ||〈b|ψ′1〉||2 =
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
(1 − η). (12)
When Bob does not find the state |b〉, |ψ′
1
〉 reduces to
|ψ′
2
〉 =
√
1 + 2ǫ |a〉+√η (1− 2ǫ) |b′〉√
1 + 2ǫ+ η (1− 2ǫ) , (13)
which in turn leads to
PD = 1− ||〈ψ2|ψ′2〉||2 =
2η
(
1−√1− 4ǫ2)
(1 + η)2 + 2ǫ (1− η2) . (14)
Substituting eq.(12) and eq.(14) in eq.(3), we find GB
in terms of the splitting parameter η, the preparation
parameter ǫ and R:
GB = − 1
1 + η
[
2ǫ (1− η2) + η (η +
√
1− 4ǫ2)
− η (1 −
√
1− 4ǫ2) R
]
. (15)
In order to calculate the minimal gain of Bob, δ, irre-
spective of the particular strategy of Alice, we will first
minimize GB for ǫ and then maximize the result for η:
δ(R) =Max η [Min ǫGB(R, η, ǫ)]. (16)
The calculations yield
δ = − 1
1 +
√
R+ 2−√(R + 2)2 − 1
×
{
2 +
[
R−
√
(R + 2)2 − 1
]
×
[
1−
√
R+ 2−
√
(R + 2)2 − 1
]}
, (17)
obtained for Bob’s splitting parameter
η˜ =
√
R+ 2−
√
(R + 2)2 − 1. (18)
In the range of R≫ 1, these results can be simplified to
δ ≈ −
√
2
R
, (19)
η˜ ≈
√
1
2R
. (20)
We have shown that if Bob follows the proposed strat-
egy with η = η˜, then his average gain is not less than δ;
this bound converges to 0, i.e. to the limit of a fair game,
for R →∞. This is true for any possible strategy of Al-
ice, therefore, the security of the protocol is established.
To compare our scheme to a real gambling situation,
let us consider the well-known Roulette game. A bet of
1 coin on the red/black numbers, i.e. half of the 36 num-
bers on the table, rewards the gambler with 1 coin once
in 18/38 turns (on average, for a spinning wheel with
38 slots); this gives an expected gain of about −0.053
coins. To assure the same gain in our scheme, R = 700
is required. Note that extremely large values of R are
practically meaningless, one reason being the limited to-
tal amount of money in use. Nevertheless, the bound on
δ is not too restrictive when looking at the first prizes of
some lottery games: a typical value of R = 106 gives a
reasonably small δ of about −0.0014.
It is also interesting to consider the case of R = 1.
This case corresponds to coin tossing, since it has only
two outcomes: Bob’s gain is either −1 coin (stands for
bit ‘0’) or 1 coin (stands for bit ‘1’). The minimal average
gain of Bob is about −0.657, which translates to an oc-
currence probability of bit ‘1’ of at least 0.172 (instead of
0.5 ideally), whatever Alice does. This is certainly not a
good coin tossing scheme, however, no classical or quan-
tum method is known to assure (unconditionally) any
bound for the occurrence probability of both outcomes.
Our analysis so far was restricted to a single instance
of the game, but the protocol may be repeated several
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times. After N games Bob’s expected gain is GB ≥ Nδ
and Alice’s expected gain is GA ≥ 0. Of course, Al-
ice may choose now a complex strategy using ancillas
and correlations between particles/ancillas from differ-
ent runs. In this way she may change the probability
distribution of her winnings, but she cannot reduce the
minimal expected gain of Bob. Indeed, our proof consid-
ers the most general actions of Alice, so the average gain
of Bob in each game is not less than δ, and consequently,
it is not less then Nδ after N games. A similar argument
is valid for Bob’s actions, so the average gain of Alice
remains non-negative even after N games. In gambling
games, in addition to the average gain, it is important
to analyze the standard deviation of the gain, ∆G. Bob
will normally accept to play a game with a negative gain
only if ∆GB ≫ |GB | (unless he has some specific target in
mind). In a single application of our protocol, ∆GB ≥ 1,
so the condition is attained for big enough values of R
(see eq.(19)). However, increasing the number of games
makes the gambling less attractive to Bob: if Alice fol-
lows the proposed strategy, |GB| grows as N while ∆GB
grows only as
√
N . Therefore, Bob should accept to play
N times only if N ≪ 1/δ2 ∼ R.
Another important point to consider is the possible
“cheating” of the parties. Alice has no meaningful way
to cheat, since she is allowed to prepare any quantum
state and she sends no classical information to Bob. Any
operation other than preparing |ψ0〉, as adding ancillas
or putting more/less than one particle in the boxes, just
decreases her minimal gain. Bob, however, may try to
cheat. He may claim that he detected a different prepa-
ration than |ψ0〉, even when his verification measurement
does not show that. If Alice prepares the initial state |ψ′
0
〉
(with ǫ > 0), she is vulnerable to this cheating attempt:
she has no way to know if Bob is lying or not. For this
reason Alice’s proposed strategy is to prepare |ψ0〉 every
time, such that any cheating of Bob could be invariably
detected. When both parties follow the proposed strate-
gies, i.e. ǫ = 0 and η = η˜, the game is more fair for Bob
than assumed in the proof:
GB prot = −GA prot = −
√
R+ 2−
√
(R+ 2)2 − 1. (21)
For R ≫ 1 we get GB prot ≈ −1/
√
2R, which is approxi-
mately half of the value of δ calculated in eq.(19).
The discussion up to this point assumed an ideal ex-
perimental setup. In practice errors are unavoidable, of
course, and our protocol is very sensitive to the errors
caused by the devices used in its implementation (com-
munication channels, detectors, etc). In the presence of
errors, if the parties disagree about the result of a par-
ticular run it should be canceled. If such conflicts oc-
cur more than expected based on the experimental error
rate, it means that (at least) one party is cheating, and
the game should be stopped. The most sensitive part to
errors is the verification measurement of Bob, i.e. the de-
tection of the possible deviation of the initial state from
|ψ0〉. In the ideal case, using η˜ and the corresponding
ǫ (the worst for honest Bob), the detection probability
is very small: PD ≈
√
2/R3, for R ≫ 1. Clearly, for a
successful realization of the protocol, the error rate has
to be lower than this number. Thus, in practice, the ex-
perimental error rate will constrain the maximal possible
value of R [7].
In conclusion, we have built a simple yet effective pro-
tocol for quantum gambling. We have proved that no
party can increase her/his winnings beyond some limit,
which converges to 0 when R goes to infinity, if the oppo-
nent follows the proposed strategy. An important aspect
of our protocol is that it shows that secure two-party
quantum cryptography is possible, in spite of the failure
of quantum bit commitment. The possibility of having
other so-called “post-cold-war applications” remains an
open question.
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